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Part I

Building up the Context

1 Preliminaries

Marie-Cécile Bertau

The Ghent Conference

Context

The *Second Conference on the Dialogical Self* took place in Ghent (Belgium), October 18-20 2002, and was organized by Hubert J.M. Hermans (University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands), Dan MacAdams (Northwestern University, Evanstone, USA), Robert A. Neimeyer (University of Memphis (TN), USA), Hendrikus Stam (University of Calgary, Canada), Jaan Valsiner (Clark University, Worcester-Boston (MA), USA), and Leni Verhofstadt-Denève (Ghent University, Belgium).

Hubert Hermans was not only the Conference Chair and the Chair of the Scientific Committee, he is also the one who exudes inspiration and fruitful enthusiasm for what could be called the Dialogical Movement. This movement took up known, but neglected ideas on the fundamental dialogicity of man, and transferred them into modern concepts in several disciplines concerned with his/her development, with acting, thinking, speaking and the understanding in and of the world. The movement has its starting point in psychology, more specifically in psychotherapy, but its development has spread through a lot of disciplines such as cognitive psychology, neurology, developmental and clinical psychology, cultural psychology, anthropology, sociology, literacy sciences, linguistics and psycholinguistics.

This ramified development could be observed in Ghent, where quite different scientists met in a situation that allowed cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary exchanges: this at least was one of the most interesting aspects of the Conference, and generally speaking it seems to be a feature of the Dialogical Movement itself - owed to a great extent to the openmindedness of Hubert Hermans.(1)

Symposium

The present book is to be understood as a documentation of the outcomes of one of the symposiums of the Conference, a symposium I had the pleasure to organize and run - so it is just a quite small piece of the big cake the readers should imagine. The topic of the symposium was *The significance of internal dialogues in problem-solving and psychological growth*.

Departing from a psycholinguistical and socio-cultural approach, its aim was to present several perspectives on the phenomenon of inner speech on the borders of communication and cognition, and of individual and social performances which are themselves defined by their historicity and current presence. The symposium was concerned with the concept of development in different respects: in regard to the relation between inner speech and literacy (Juan Daniel Ramirez), to questions and their special role for the dialogical self (Marie-Cécile Bertau), and to the role of mutuality in psychological growth (Vera John-Steiner). Additional guests on the podium were Heike Baldauf (a conversational analyst) and Paul Goudena (known for his developmental work on inner speech).(2)

The general intention was to underline and to try to capture the role of language, especially of communicative language (speech) in acting and thinking as precisely as possible. This intention is explicitly turned to the *social* dimensions of human thought and activity, stating that even highly abstract, seemingly detached and solitary modes of acting and thinking are and remain grounded in social life and get their very character from there.

Composition of the Book

Taking the core term of the Conference seriously, the book tries to capture some dialogicity, some „voicedness“ of the symposium in its structure. The reader will therefore find - after an introduction to the theory of the dialogical self accompanied by a proposition on modeling - as second part a documentation of the symposium as it took place: papers by the three contributors, each followed by comments. This was done with the help of an audio cassette transcribed afterwards.

After the symposium's documentation one can find an additional topic in part three which was not discussed in Ghent but between several participants during the preparations of the symposium. It seems of such an interest that it

has been added here. This does not at all mean that the topic of addressivity is only an addendum - on the contrary it is perhaps one of the most important and complex issues in the dialogical self. In my own contribution I try to open up the horizon in which addressivity could be placed, departing from philosophy, going via conversational analysis to developmental aspects. This more general approach is supplied by two contributions dealing with specific moments of addressivity. Heike Baldauf focuses on special cases of addressivity: open states of talk, faked multiple addressing, and self-talk. Marta Soler-Gallart is a new voice we have the pleasure to welcome, her contribution could well be read as a complement of Ramirez' article, since it deals with dialogical reading, stating the transformative force of addressing.

Notes

- (1) For the readers who are new to the field of dialogicity, the following references might be interesting and useful. As key articles one could read Hermans, Kempen and van Loon, (1992) and Hermans (1996); the reference book is Hermans and Kempen (1993); finally, among others, the special issues on dialogicity of *Culture & Psychology* (7, 3, 2001) and of *Theory & Psychology* (12, 2, 2002) show the multiple branches of this approach.
- (2) Cf. the list of contributors and the end of the book.

2 The Theory of the Dialogical Self and a Proposition for Modeling

Marie-Cécile Bertau

The aim of this second chapter is to provide an introduction to the main aspects of the theory of the dialogical self as it is conceived by Hermans in different works (2001, 2002, Hermans et al. 1992) and by Hermans and Kempen (1993). This will also be done by means of extracting some core themes named in the theory as well as underlying it. In a second step, there will be a proposal for modeling different states of the dialogical self, in order to reconcile conceptions of Hermans and other authors, mainly Lewis' very interesting one (see Lewis 2002); in this way, I hope to arrive at an internal structure of the dialogical self which could be able to cover and relate several observed states of the self and at the same time give some hints at the issue of addressivity - the topic of part three.

Conceptions of the Self

James and Mead

Hermans mainly relies on conceptions of the self found in William James and George Herbert Mead. Because Hermans has often (Hermans 1996, 2001, 2002; Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Hermans et al.1992) and clearly developed James' and Mead's position, there will be only some reminders here in order to get the connection with Herman's own approach.

In his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) William James discerns two aspects of the self: the I and the Me. The I is the self-as-knower, is to be thought of as organizing consciousness, and is itself a process. According to Hermans and Kempen (1993), the conception of the I enables James to account for continuity in the self, which is characterized by three features (following Hermans 1996): continuity (sense of personal identity and sameness), distinctness (feeling that own existence is separated from others), and volition (related to the continuous appropriation and rejection of thoughts).

The Me, on the other hand, is the self-as-known; it is thought to be the empirical self, extending to all the exterior things in which the subject recognizes

itself, distinguishable in a material, a social and a spiritual Me. With the Me, James accounts for discontinuity in the self, and with the extension onto things in the world he demonstrates that the self is no separate, clear-cut entity.(1)

The distinction between I and Me relates the two aspects of a person, the experience every one makes: being the same and at the same time being different in different social (and cultural) contexts, changing over time (Hermans and Kempen 1993).

George Herbert Mead, a friend and pupil of James, discerns in *Mind, Self and Society* (1934) I and Me, too. An additional important concept is the well known *generalized other*, related to the Me. Compared with James, Mead gives I and Me different roles, this is clearly analysed by Hermans and Kempen (1993). But some aspects of the generalized other should first be mentioned.

The generalized other is conceptualized by Mead through the difference between play and game. In play, children (and primitives) learn to take the attitude of a well-defined other (mother, father, doctor, teacher, pupil etc.), this is therefore a concrete, personifying level of attitude-change. On the contrary, in a game (baseball is the paradigm) one should be able to take the role of any body or any position, at the same time as the relationship between these roles: only then one can speak of a „fully developed self“. This role (taken up by adults and civilized people) does not correspond to an individual role (as in play) but to an organized role, crucial for identity. The organized community gives the individual his unitary identity.

The level here is an abstract one, allowing for abstract, logical thinking which does not need to be personified any more. Internal dialogues are conceived by Mead, but their development from a personified to an abstract, generalized addressee clearly demonstrates a rationalist position: true thinking does not need any *body*, any person (see Mead 1967, footnote 8, 155f.). Moreover, there is a clear depreciation of children and so called primitive people together with an over-estimation of adults and so called civilized people.

The I is the reaction of the organism toward the attitudes of the others, the I is the acting one, but no one - even the I - can tell what this reaction will look like: so the I is related to novelty and innovation; it seems to guarantee individuality in Mead's theory.

The Me, on the other hand, is given, expressed in attitudes taken and expressed in the generalized other. The Me represents the organized group of attitudes of the others one takes over; it forms the conscious identity (mead 1967,

175). Being related to the group or community, it evaluates and censors, in contrast to the I which is impulsive.

Turning now to the analysis of Hermans and Kempen (1993), it becomes clear that Mead has reversed the functions of I and Me. In James, the I guarantees continuity, whereas the Me is related to changes. In Mead, it is the Me, as conveying rules and conventions of the group, which is the site of the sameness of the self; the I stands for innovation and brings discontinuity.

Regarding dialogicity, Hermans and Kempen (1993) state that Mead's self, developing through the internalization of the other, remains monological; at best it is influenced and coordinated by the others (see the baseball game). The authors conclude that Mead's self conception is monological and consider it (with Taylor, 1991) to be a special form of individualism (see Hermans and Kempen 1993, 107; Taylor (1991) as cited there).

In contrast, the authors see voiced positions in James' multiple social selves, speaking with conflicting voices, related to one another by „dialogical opposition“ (114). Hermans (1996) cites a long passage of James where the self is in conflict between several possible selves, several characters. What is a bit critical here is the fact that the self seems to be able to look at the possible roles to take and to *choose*, seemingly freely:

But to make any one of [the characters] actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self *must review the list carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation.* (...) Our thought, *incessantly deciding*, among many things of a kind, which one shall be realities, here *chooses* one of many *possible selves or characters* ...

(James 1902, cited in Hermans 1996, 35-36; emphasis added, except the last one)

In regard to individual, institutional, societal, cultural and economic patterns and constraints every one of us is subject to, this freely and quite *consciously* deciding self seems to correspond to the image of a self-made, independent son of a wealthy family (as William James) - or to the image of the new man in post-modern, neoliberal times: the flexible, constantly changing and adapting man.(2)

Hermans and Hermans and Kempen (1993)

As already seen, Hermans and Kempen (1993) are more in line with James than with Mead.⁽³⁾ In contrast to Mead, they want to preserve „relatively autonomous“ positions in the self, therefore they reformulate the generalized other as a „collective voice“: as such, the individual speaks with the words of his group, social class or society, and the possibility for the voices to enter in conflicts is given. As already indicated by the term „dialogical opposition“, this very conflict relates the voices through its dialogue, and involves always the possibility of novelty: for the outcome of a dialogue is undetermined. Conflict is itself related to tension: the beginning of an open-ended dialogue in the course of which the „voices are co-constructing a standpoint that is not predictable from the beginning.“ (Hermans and Kempen 1993, 115). It is in this unpredictability, related to the aspect of novelty, that the possibility for a change lies, which can be seen as central to the author's conception of the voiced self.

The authors analyse - as seen - continuity of the self in James as related to the I, and discontinuity as related to the Me, whereas in Mead the Me stands for continuity and the I for novelty and discontinuity. Their own standpoint reflects a tendency to reconcile opposite opinions and theoretical notions, a tendency which could be observed throughout their book; „dialogue“ as the paradigm of relationship and exchange is the very term of this theoretical, synthesizing reconciliation, the core of their conception and the main gesture of their thinking.

Hermans and Kempen (1993) *incorporate* both terms of continuity and discontinuity in the notion of „I-positions“; continuity is located in the term „I“, discontinuity in the term „positions“:

As far as the individual takes different and contrasting positions (and associated attitudes), there is discontinuity; because it is the same *I* that is involved in these changes, there is continuity. In other words, the composite term *I position* covers both the continuity and the discontinuity of the self.

(Hermans and Kempen 1993, 115; emphasis in the original)

The self is conceived as a multiplicity of I-positions in which the other is involved - being positively (as a position one wants to be) or negatively evaluated (as a position one fears to be): that is, the other cannot be dissolved from the self. The self is seen as a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I-positions in an imaginal landscape: here, the I can move between several positions

(„fluctuating I“) and it can endow each position with a voice: in this way the self can establish dialogues between positions. Voices become characters of a story, each voice telling her story from her own position, which is unique due to the very term „position“.

This term, as well as „character“, refers to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory, the third leading figure in the conception of Hermans and Hermans and Kempen (1993). Bakhtin’s work and theory on the dialogicity of the human mind is also taken up in modern psychology, e.g. in Wertsch’s socio-culturally oriented work.(4)

Hermans (e.g. 1996, 1992) takes up Bakhtin’s notion of the polyphonic novel, composed of a number of independent, mutually opposing viewpoints, embodied by dialogically interacting characters. The notion further implies that there is no single and central author, but several authors, thinkers, voices with their own standpoint and own story to tell.

It is worth noting that the voices are situated in different spatial positions: this *spatialization* is important for Hermans and Kempen’s theory because it allows distinctiveness and therefore distinct voices to be heard at all. The metaphor of a landscape where the I moves from position to position takes up the idea of space. In Hermans (1996) there is a citation out of Bakhtin’s work through which Hermans makes clear that the voices are not only separated, but coexistent and juxtaposed in space; moreover, in Dostoyevsky, Bakhtin observes a „dramatization in space“ (Hermans 1996, 32). This is the point for Hermans to conceive the I as moving, fluctuating in the imaginal landscape among positions, even opposing ones. And Hermans deliberately chooses the terms „position“ and „positioning“ which is more flexible and dynamic than „role“.

In order to give the dynamic multiplicity of the self cohesiveness, Hermans and Kempen (1993) conceive a third, synthesizing position which they call „the capitalized Self“. The Self is an active process, relating different autonomous positions in an organized whole (the self); the Self relates positions through juxtaposition and dialogical exchanges so that the positions (through the dialogical touch, so to speak) are influencing each other and changing; the Self can be inspired by voices from others; as a third position it is different: this position reflects another state of consciousness, seems to be able to take a balanced perspective, finally this perspective is a meta-perspective. Therefore, the Self is one of the I-positions, but it is more concerned with relationships, whereas the other I-positions are concerned about themselves as particular aspects of the self.

The synthesis the Self is trying to reach is not to be conceived as monolithic, rather it is a constant activity, a constant attempt and search for synthesis which is counteracted by the I-positions wanting to increase their relative autonomy (cases may happen where an I-position becomes more dominant than the others). There are two forces at work: a centripetal one from the Self and a centrifugal one from the I-positions. Moreover, it may be the case that an I-position becomes so dominant that even the Self is suppressed temporarily. Finally, the two main features of the dialogical self are derived from dialogue itself: intersubjective exchange and dominance.

Commenting on Some Core Notions

Some core notions in the theory of the dialogical self by Hermans and Hermans and Kempen (1993) as developed above should briefly be mentioned and commented on. These notions are: the *movement* or *fluctuation* of the I, the *tension* involved in dialogical exchanges, the *positions* related with *spatialization*, and the *Self* as a balanced position.

The assumed *movement* of the I, fluctuating among several positions, reflects, in my opinion, a *possible movement*, constrained by two aspects. The first of these aspects corresponds to possibilities of the self and refers to individual (psychobiographical), social, cultural and historical conditions which mould first of all the landscape Hermans and Kempen (1993) are conceiving, and then the movements in this space.

One could deduct an ideal underlying the conception of the authors: an open landscape where one can freely move and see the whole panorama of positions up to the horizon; some positions may be hidden behind a bush or a hill or even buried in the ground, but the ability to see, which belongs to consciousness, and the ability to move, which belongs to freedom, are given. Moreover: this image is the good one, the one which is to be attained: a positive state. The notion of man is a cooperative one, were interacting individuals are willing to live together, acting out their conflicts in productive ways, always interested in developing themselves: these are the dialogical persons *par excellence*.

Even though this view is very appealing, it is worth noting that it is a view, a perception (cf. Humboldt's term *Weltanschauung*), a choice to a certain extent. One can easily imagine another view of the self, where not so much movement is considered as good, or where movement is reserved to some people like artists or magicians and priests, but is not regarded to be good for secular

women and men. Or: one aspect of women's liberation could be interpreted in terms of „gaining positions“, that is gaining movement, being more free to move among several I-positions, widening one own's landscape, removing the (outer and inner) barriers. With this socio-historical change, the ideal of a feminine self changed, too. In other words: movements are not least a question of standards. The landscape itself is moulded by cultural and societal norms, habits and expectations.

The second aspect constraining the possible movements of the self is corollary to the first one and has already been commented on shortly; it corresponds to the possibilities of society, more precisely to the notion of society we have: this notion will shape our theoretical approach to any multiplicity (be it on the cellular level or on the level of I-positions). In James, the self seems to be able to look at the possible roles to take and to *choose*, seemingly freely.

This notion reminds one of the „flexible man“ of post-modern times. The question arises, if, where and how this fluctuating self is *anchored*. In terms of Hermans and Kempen (1993): where the Self gets its organizing metaposition from and how it sustains it. In reviewing examples of approaches involving a decentralized self, Hermans and Kempen (1993, 37) mention the work of Stone and Winkelman (1985) who conceive a system with an „aware ego“ which is supposed to be conscious of all the subpersonalities at work. This ego functions as a central point of reference, but is not at all a center of fusion; rather it is a „center of intense awareness“. This seems to me to be an interesting notion, but the problem is the notion of „awareness“. How is it reached? What about states - well known to all of us - where there is much more uncontrolled, unconscious, undetermined „swimming“ among positions or subpersonalities? Are we perhaps over-estimating awareness and consciousness in our „reflexive modernization“?(6) To what extent do we (theoretically) depict a self we (actually) wish to be, or we are supposed to be?

The notion of *tension*, related by Hermans and Kempen (1993) to the voiced positions which are in a relationship of „dialogical opposition“, is quite central for the openness of the dialogical relationship and for the possibility of changes in the self. This notion is interesting and useful because it gives way to a dynamic conception which need not to be resolved, and which can therefore sustain paradoxical and conflicting states - this is precisely one of the aims of Hermans and Kempen's theoretical approach (see their discussion in „The Illusion of Final Unification“, 93 ff).

In working on metaphor, Ricœur (1978, 1975) develops the notion of tension. It could be named a „hold tension“, not resolved and giving way to different states of meaning at a time. It holds literal and metaphorical meaning, for the literal sense is not completely transformed through the metaphorical one: a tension between both interpretations remains, the literal one remains visible through the metaphorical interpretation. Metaphor is not a completely new, detached sense, it is a new sense that allows to see the old, the usual one with other eyes; or - to speak in terms of the theory of the dialogical self: to see it from another position. This term perfectly fits the conception of another metaphorist, Perrin (1987), who sees the situatedness of one own's speaking and experiencing expressed in metaphors; metaphors are in this conception strategies of locating oneself (the own self):

Metaphor ... is an experiential strategy by which we locate ourselves in one position so that our words answer the question, What did you see when you were there?

(Perrin 1987, 266)

This is to say that the notion of tension allows to hold together paradoxical, conflicting points of view, and generally allows a theory to sustain discrepant states and their transitions.(7)

That the notion of *positions* is understood in terms of a *spatialization* has already been said. Now some of the related implications should be hinted at.

The notion of spatialization serves the aim of separating and distinguishing positions, so that their voices become audible at all. So it is possible to endow a position with a voice, but also to transform a thought in an utterance coming from a certain position in space and time (Bakhtin's procedure, see Hermans 1996, 32), and even (in psychotherapeutical work) to treat personal traits „*as if* they were characters that could tell a story about their own lives.“ (Hermans and Kempen 1993, 168, emphasis added). This is the Bakhtinian „*dramatization in space*“.

This process suits well what the french philosopher Henri Bergson (1946) describes in his key essay. A confuse multiplicity, belonging to quality, is projected in a numerical, distinct multiplicity. Pure duration, *durée pure*, becomes time-space, *espace-temps*, in which the solid can cristalize. That is to say that the countable multiplicity is a *notion* we are constructing, and Bergson adds (103f.): even psychology can construct this notion and work with it in quite a successful way. Through this procedure of projection in a psychological space, the I exte-

riorizes its experiences (feelings, sensations) as they were things; it solidifies them and gives them names. Even self-talk happens here:

Mais la conscience, habituée à penser dans l'espace et à se parler à elle-même ce qu'elle pense, désignera le sentiment par un seul mot et localisera l'effort au point précis où il donne un résultat ...

[But consciousness, used to think in space and to talk to herself about what it thinks, will designate the feeling with a single word and will localise the effort precisely at the point where it brings a result.]

(Bergson 1946, 19f.)

This space corresponds to our experienced time, the time lived through, which we have translated in space. This time is therefore a wrong time, the true time is *la durée pure*. And it is this pure duration, also named *durée qualité*, which is immediately reached by consciousness.

Bergson states two forms of multiplicity, two forms of appreciating duration, two aspects of conscious life (95): *la multiplicité numérique*, numerical, distinct multiplicity, and *la multiplicité qualitative*, qualitative multiplicity, called a bit later *multiplicité confuse* (96). We live in the realm of time-quality, of confuse multiplicity, where things happen; consciousness projects itself in time-quantity, distinct multiplicity, where living is suspended.

... la durée fuyante du moi se fixe par sa projection dans l'espace homogène ...

[The fleeting duration of the I fixes itself through its projection in homogenous space.]

(Bergson 1946, 97)

The procedure of projection is due to the „insatiable desire to distinguish“:

La conscience, tourmentée d'un insatiable désir de distinguer, substitue le symbole à la réalité, ou n'aperçoit la réalité qu'à travers le symbole.

[Consciousness, tormented by an insatiable desire to distinguish, substitutes the symbol for reality, or is able to perceive reality only through the symbol.]

(Bergson 1946, 95f.)

Although I do not follow Bergson in his depreciating of language and social life - belonging to the outside world and to the distinct multiplicity - I think it is important to reflect the process of projection and cristalization he describes. Spatialization as conceived by Hermans and Kempen (1993) leads to personifi-

cation, and *is supposed to* lead to it, in contrast to the depersonalized view in Mead's generalized other and in the internalized significant others of psychoanalysis who, in becoming stable objects, have lost their voice (see 108 and 115). This personification can lead to a reification which could interfere with the dynamism of the self, with its processual nature and transitional states in reducing it to discrete states. Surely Hermans and Kempen (1993) do not conceive the self in this reified way, rather, they see the process of positioning and voicing as a method, which indeed brings up changes, that is: desolidifies rigid structures. However, it seems useful to point to reification which could be - not on the level of psychological work, but on a theoretical, conceptual level - a pitfall.

Finally, a comment on the *Self*, meant as a reflection on its psychological types, which has by the way a lot to do with well-known, but voiceless, metacognition.

The Self holds a third position among the I-positions. Especially in regard to the balanced position of the Self one may ask: who is this position representing? Its nature is relating, compensating, and it has usually a position from where it is able to see more, to see the different positions and their relationships. This reminds one of good, friendly and just parents, compensating and managing conflicts among siblings. Good parents accept their different children as they are and do not polarize positions (in regard to polarizing I-positions, see Hermans and Kempen 1993, 94). This Self seems to belong to the modern western small family (two parents, two children).

One can imagine at least three different types of this model. The first type would be the „cooperative model“ where parents cooperatively establish agreements among themselves, this will lead to a cooperative metaperspective, or Self. The second type could be called „strict model“ where one of the two parents dominates the other and where roles are clearly associated with each parent (e.g. patriarchy); this will lead to a more rigid metaperspective, or Self. Third, the parents do not agree, they tend to polarize their positions and they dominate each other successively, that is, there is a constant struggle for domination; this would lead to a metaperspective which is not perceivable, or a Self without its own voice for it is constantly dominated by I-positions. This model could be the „voiceless“ one. Finally, there is only one parent, but this person could principally be with herself in one of the three described positions of dominance or cooperation (model 1-3). This will therefore lead to the corresponding metaperspectives, or Selves.

These types could be conceived as basic positions of the Self, each having variants which are evocable through situations and contexts, this would be what Hermans and Kempen describe as „self-situation interaction“

The situation has the power to evoke a particular character in the self and can even reinforce this character so that it becomes dominant. (...)

The self-situation interaction can also account for the fact that people may feel that they achieve in some situations a much greater degree of synthesis than in other situations.

(Hermans and Kempen 1993, 95)

A Structure of Emergent States

The proposal of a structure of emergent states is to be understood as a first sketch, which has arisen mainly from reading Lewis (2002), where a possibility of internal structure of the *dialogical* aspect of the dialogical self can be found. This proposal is also to be read in line with Hermans and Kempen's (1993) view of the self as a non-linear system. I fully agree with this view, starting for my part from the assumption that all interesting systems show a dynamical behavior and are not feasibly computable.(8)

Only simple, mechanistic models (e.g. linear and integrable ones) are easily predictable in an exact way. The behavior of complex, non-linear systems, like the weather and living organisms, may be modelizable in a so-called intractable, but computable way, in a semi-computable way, or are even not computable at all.(9)

Although the mathematical modeling of complex systems may be deterministic in detail, small disturbances can result in large unpredictable effects - there is no longer strong causality in any case. But their behavior need not automatically become chaotic: our solar system for example, keeps its stable state because of the harmonic arrangement of its planets (see Worg (1993) for details).

Discussing Lewis (2002)

In cognitive sciences, Lewis (2002) recognizes a move away from the information-processing paradigm toward embodiment in cognitive processes. His aim

is to translate Hermans' view of the self into this notion of embodiment (which is situated in the context of non-linear, dynamic systems, too). Lewis takes up the concept of voicing: this is construed as action, and related to brain regions involved in planning and generating voluntary speech. On the other hand it is construed as listening, and related to attentional systems where the speech of others is anticipated. The integration of these functions would be the site of dialogicity in the brain.

Before going into a detailed analysis of brain functions and systems, Lewis (2002) proceeds with a deduction in four steps. The first step departs from a fundamental experience, saying that most of the inner voices are the own ones, coming from a „familiar I-position“, without clear addressee (178).

In the second step Lewis states that

... one does not have to be actively speaking or actively listening to be in a dialogical relationship.

(Lewis 2002, 179)

Third, Lewis argues that

the experience of dialogicity may often be the experience of expecting dialogue, that is, the experience of acting *as if* someone might be listening to us, evaluating us and ready to react verbally.

(Lewis 2002, 179; emphasis in the original)

Finally, Lewis concludes that internal dialogues are indeed real, but they are „usually sublingual and inchoate“. The voice of the other is an expected, but rare event. Therefore, we spend much more time in the familiar I-position than in any other state (179, 182).

This deduction is the base on which three conditions for a neural model are formulated. I will pick up two of them. The second one is named „articulation issue“ and concerns the level or degree to which motor events (speaking) and perceptual events (hearing) take place. Lewis conceives a spectrum from vague, gist-like sensations to articulated words or utterances.

This amounts to saying that not all internal dialogues merge at the surface, they remain unspecified, but the voices are still „intended in speaking“, or „actively attended to in hearing“ (180). Together with Lewis' second step, one can state a kind of *basic dialogical attitude* which may be unfolded, but also may remain global, gist-like, unspecified.(10) Following Lewis' illustration of Mary who is miscooking the rice, one may be tempted to conclude that this basic

dialogical attitude develops when problems are encountered. The strength of the problem together with its emotional value will lead to a more or less developed internal dialogue.(11)

The third of Lewis' conditions is related to expectation and anticipation. In reviewing the (cyclic) relationships between perception, anticipation and action, Lewis concludes that the brain is concerned with what *is about* to happen and translates this in dialogical terms:

In terms of dialogue, attention (hearing) would be guided by expectation of what „I“ am about to say, and action (speaking) would be guided by what „you“ are about to say.

(Lewis 2002, 180)

This goes well with the third step saying that most of the time we expect more than we really hear the voice of the other. Expectations are a powerful means in communication, related to the typicality and rituality of events and fundamental for any orientation. This is a reason why *inchoate*, not fully unfolded processes are understandable. Another reason may be found in processes described by Garfinkel (1975): in trying to be understood and in trying to understand we have to rely on some principles leading us through the unformulable, for we cannot say *anything*. At the end, we must say „you know what I mean“ and our listener replies „yes, I know, what you mean“.(12)

Lewis (2002) adds an aspect which demonstrates the independency of the internal dialogue (now termed monologue) simultaneously with its directedness to the other:

The internal monologue ... is surprisingly self-sustaining, and one way it sustains itself is by anticipating the other's response. Whether inchoate or articulate, the motor plans generated by anticipation of criticism are *in relation to* the imagined other.

(Lewis 2002, 182; emphasis in the original)

What develops is an independent, fluid dialogue, where I do not need to leave my familiar I-position, remaining by myself, *because* I can imagine the other and what he is about to say, and what I reply, and what he is then about to reply etc. And because of that, he doesn't need to speak at all: I don't *let him speak really*, he has no actual voice, only - but quite important - *presence*: the source of my anticipation and action. And it is to this presence that the dialogical attitude is related, building up a special kind of atmosphere which envelopes my inner actions (thinking and speaking, be they at a gist-like or at an unfolded level). From a developmental point of view, one may assume that the presence

comes from the primary and significant others - and their quality of being-there will shape the later felt presence. The soviet psychologist Rubinshtein has described this aspect in thinking:

In inner speech, language renounces its original function ... However, inner speech, like any language, possesses social character. (...) ... the transformed structure, too, shows clear traces of its social descent. (...) Inner speech is social also in regard to its content. The affirmation that it is a monologue is not really precise. (...) Any man's word expressed in thinking has its audience *in whose atmosphere* his considerations take place.

(Rubinshtein 1977, 521; own translation; emphasis added.(13))

The term „audience“ appears also in Baldwin and Holmes (1987), where private audiences function like internal representations of significant others; these watch and listen to the person and respond to him/her with somewhat stereotypical and affect-laden evaluations.

Returning to the site of dialogicity in the brain, Lewis (2002) assumes an exchange between two attentional systems, the first one being more responsive, the second one more impulsive. Lewis concludes:

The internal monologue described so far does indeed have a dialogical character, based on the creation of an expectable other in relation to whom one voices one's own position. (...) However, these monologues do not have the vitality of Hermans' polyphonic self. They repeat familiar stances, they are devoid of novelty and they miss any true exchange or confrontation between *autonomous* voiced positions.

(Lewis 2002, 185; emphasis in the original)

In considering then how a shift to a different, alternative, autonomous I-position can be modeled, Lewis comes to think of the possibility that „internal monologues progress through many shades of emotional content as well as gradations of emotional intensity, along with the shifting images of the anticipated other.“ (Lewis 2002, 186). If I understand this well, this means that shifting away from the familiar to the alternate I-position is due to a process of emotionalizing.

In this way, Lewis is indeed able to square his neurally based assumptions with Hermans' model of the polyphonic voiced self.

Modeling the Structure of Emergent States

It is worth noting that Lewis (2002) oscillates between the terms „internal *dialogue*“ and „internal *monologue*“, describing the second ones as „indeed [having] a dialogical character“ (see citation from 185, above). Together with Rubinshtein’s basic assumption of the social character of inner speech which leads to the term „monologue“ being not very precise, and together with Lewis’ conception of a spectrum from vague and gist-like sensations to articulated words or utterances, I would like to propose the following sketch.

A structure of emergent states is to be assumed, involving Lewis’ vague and gist-like states as well as the explicitly articulated states. These emergent states can be formulated in analogy to attractors belonging to self-organizing systems, often with self-similar structures and processes.

Returning to the example of the solar system with its stability due to the harmonic arrangement of its planets, one must now add that a long-term prognosis about the behavior of this system is not possible, hence the problem of stability is still unsolved. But: it can be shown that the golden mean seems to be the best attractor for quasi-periodic systems to become stable, thereby leading to stable islands in chaos.(14) So chaos is not „chaotic“, rather there are states of stability emerging and desintegrating (see Worg 1993); these states are accessible to human perception for they reflect a certain harmony, although they are a kind of unpredictable consequence and will lead to unpredictable consequences.

Every non-linear process leads to branch points, to forks in the path at which the system may take one branch or another. Decisions are made whose consequences cannot be predicted, because each decision has the character of an amplification. The smallest differences are blown up and have far-reaching effects. Causality holds at every single instant, but it does not carry over a sequences of branchings. Sooner or later the initial knowledge of the system becomes irrelevant. In the unfolding of a process, information is generated and retained. The natural laws allow for many different courses of events, but our world has only one history.

(Peitgen and Richter 1986, 1f.)

Despite unpredictable consequences in detail (zooming effect leading to self-similar repetitions in structure), one can figure out harmonic structures in regard to the complete process. This harmony emerges in inorganic systems (solar system, weather, dripping tap), in living systems (organisms, heart

functions), as well as in mathematical formulas (logistical function). These structures are e.g. visually perceivable, as in architecture built on the principle of the golden mean, and not the least - as I think - emotionally perceivable, as in experiencing states of the self (Hermans' I-positions).

In the self too, stable states can emerge, according to attractors: harmonic proportions where the system can stabilize itself. I use the notion of attractors as an analogy, associating with it a moment of dense and stable being, feeling, or perceiving (see above the kind of intense awareness described by Stone and Winkelman 1985). This moment can desintegrate, leading to the disappearance of an I-position (Hermans 2001, 254). But once initiated and emerged (through e.g. certain experiences of emotional and/or complexity strength), the states will cristalize, becoming increasingly dense with repeated experiences; they can even be systematically evoked (e.g. through excercising, through psychotherapeutic work).

They then emerge and re-emerge, and it may be the case that new states emerge out of the states already figured out (generating and retaining, see above). This processes would stand for the creativity of man and his self, but people differ greatly, especially in regard to their dialogical power. This power can be suppressed, or developed, fostered or even destroyed. One can imagine lives where emergence seldom happens, although it could have happen more often, in a more complex and in a more dynamic way.(15)

Three basic states are to be discerned in this structure: the first one in the *state of monophonic dialogicity*, the second one *the state of diphonic dialogicity*, and the last one *the state of polyphonic dialogicity*. Transitions between these states should be assumed, functioning sometimes fluidly, sometimes by leaps. Core qualities are related to these states: the degree of articulatedness (see Lewis 2002), the quality of the other, the degree of expectedness, the quality of exchange and the degree of consciousness.

The monophony of the first level is well described by Lewis (2002) who states that the self does not leave its familiar I-position, anticipating the reactions of the other. I have paraphrased this by writing that the self does not let the other really speak, he has no actual voice, only presence. There is only one voice: the one of the familiar I-position. But the other is *there*, the self is in a dialogical attitude, in an atmosphere of communication. So - in regard to the quality of the other - one can speak of a vague presence, even rather an atmosphere, „atmosphere“ being more vague than „presence“.

In regard to the degree of articulatedness, Lewis' description of the gist-like level with inchoate, sublingual dialogues is quite appropriate. The dialogical turns in this state are expected, stereotyped, so that anticipations may do the whole job, the other is not really needed. Therefore, the structure of dialogicity is quite rigid, not involving any innovation, very routinized. The quality of exchange is low and, as Lewis states, there is no confrontation, no „true exchange“ with a real other. Finally, this state is unconscious, but felt.

Hermans (2002) points to research that fits the notion of a structure of different states well, involving more or less dialogicity and more or less consciousness:

Research on private audiences, relational schemas and other script-like phenomena, associated with repetitive, sublingual and stabilized expectancies that form a subconscious or unconscious basis of more explicit dialogical processes. On the less conscious levels we are more monological and conservative than we may think in the midst of our more conscious dialogues. We are dialogical on a monological basis.

(Hermans 2002, 151)

I don't agree with the last sentence, in my opinion, we *are* dialogical: more or less. How would dialogue result from monologue? I assume with Vygotsky that monologue is the most complex form of speech and that it cannot be at any beginning, at least developmentally (see Vygotskij 2002, 441; chap.7 of *Thinking and Speech*). Moreover (and against Vygostky): if we may ever talk of a monologue, it is a sublimated dialogue, or a dialogue were the roles of speaking and listening are asymmetrically distributed, at least over time. With Buber (1997) and Humboldt (1994), the starting point here is the fundamental and - to use an untranslatable german hermeneutic term - *unbintergehbare* dialogicity of language and man.(16) Also for this reason, I call Lewis' (2002) internal monologue monophonic dialogue - with this term being in line with his own description.

Through emotionalizing processes and/or growing complexity (felt as „problem“), a shift to the second state of diphonic dialogicity happens. Here, there is more articulatedness, the dialogical attitude is more pronounced, we are consciously *directed to* the other who condenses as a certain presence, as another. This other is now allowed to speak for himself, from his position, his story - to take up Hermans' term - becomes audible. Therefore, expectedness goes back, unexpectedness and dialogical exchange with possible confrontati-

ons come forth. The movement is no more fixed in the I-position but goes to and fro, in the rhythm of turns.

Finally, in the state of polyphonic dialogicity, there is maximal articulation together with the possibility to move in a whole landscape (Hermans), actualizing alternate positions, endowing them with a voice. This state is related to consciousness, distinctness and autonomy of the others, and the possibility to innovate: repositioning the self. And - so to speak at the top of articulatedness - the possibility to construct positions, like Hermans and Kempen (1993) describe it for people in psychotherapeutic work who endow emotional states and personal traits with voices.

The shift from the monophonic to the polyphonic state is related to an opening of an inner space and to possibilities to move in it: first, there is rigidity, almost no movement; then comes an opening to the diphonic space, a distance appears which makes positions, feelings, thoughts etc. (autonomously) perceptible, therefore conscious; lastly, the dialogical space of the second state widens itself to a landscape, the movement is wider too, the possibility to look from different positions and from different nearnesses and distances (in relation to the familiar I-position) is increasing. In my view, Hermans' psychotherapeutic work is doing just this: opening up dialogical spaces and giving possibilities to move, which is: to become conscious.

It should be underlined that the above description of the shift does not mean that I-positions are necessarily multiplying themselves with increasing phonicity. It may well be the case that a multiplicity of positions exists at the state of monophonicity, but not articulated. In the process of articulation, the multiplicity becomes countable (Bergson), and it may also be the case that positions emerges. By spatializing our internal experience we cristalize given positions as well as we create new ones - the difference is very delicate.

From a more psycholinguistical point of view, an ontogenetical translation of this model can be attempted in the following way.

At a very early stage the infant is not intentionally directed to a certain person *as person*, it is a stage of diffuse social acts, taking place in a certain atmosphere, and these acts are understood by the caregivers *as if* they were intentionally directed, meant in a certain way. This leads to the first rhythmified routines (see Bruner 1997), forms of relatedness at an emotional level, and forms of order at a cognitive level, both giving orientation. This stage is related to typified events, to expectations and stereotypes. It is egocentric in regard to the

inability to decenter oneself and to address the other in an adequate way which implies the ability to take his perspective (which, even as a construct, we probably never really reach). Dialogues are (from the perspective of the infant) therefore saturated with relatedness, confused and quite dense, without distance.

In these highly routinized situations with expectable roles and actions, the mother will first take up all the roles and all the non verbal as well as verbal actions, in this way establishing a monophonic dialogicity; for she is the only voice to be heard, but the child is *there*: as a (becoming) listener, increasingly drawn in - in phonicity, in active dialogicity. It is precisely through this that the child is able to learn where and when to take up his role with adequate means: to take a turn. This will soon lead to a diphonic dialogue, beginning with the child's attention and gazing, with its vocalizings at the right place in time, becoming more and more speech-like. At the same time as the phonicity develops, the distributions of roles and actions among mother/caregiver and child takes place. Finally, a polyphonic stage might be attributed to the child's taking up the perspective of the mother in nonverbal as well as verbal actions, and a fictitious perspective, say of a lion puppet (see the beautiful example in Fogel, de Koeper, Bellagamba and Bell 2002, 200f.).

This amounts to say that out of affect-based communication a more directed, listener-oriented communication develops, becoming speech, where addressivity is increasingly refined. And to take up Bergson's (1947) notions: in early developmental stages there is a confused and qualitative multiplicity, related to pure duration which shifts with the refinement of communicative skills (and growing communicative demands from the environment) to the numeric, distinct multiplicity, where consciousness develops and becomes able to project itself in a constructed time-space (Bergson's wrong time), spatialization takes place. The imagination of the other, of his perspective and position becomes a powerful instrument for communicating and cognizing.

These hints should be worked out in a much more detailed way, taking up at least notions and research concerning developmental aspects of language in a socio-cultural perspective, of intersubjectivity and joint attention as well as of communicative skills.(17)

Especially the notions of „primary“ and „secondary intersubjectivity“ e.g. picked up in Fogel et al. (2002) are interesting in regard to the proposed model. In primary intersubjectivity (0;0 - 0;6), infants experience their self as part of a mutually regulated exchange with their caregivers; one can add: the

space of exchange is quite *local*. This could be the state of monophonic and diphonic dialogicity. In secondary intersubjectivity, infants (from 0;6 on) become able to refer to distant objects and events; one can now state that the space of exchange becomes wider and more differentiated. Finally, after 1;0, the form of intersubjectivity becomes increasingly symbolic.

In my view, the entrance of symbolic means is an important aspect of the whole development of the self, extending to the acquisition of reading and writing, having influences on the possibilities of moving, distancing, spatializing one's own self and positions. Last but not least, alphabetical literacy influences the structures of conceptions, especially of stories, narrations; it has been demonstrated how the shift to literacy changes orality, changes the way of narrating events.(18)

Topics of the Symposium

Three main topics were presented and discussed in Ghent: inner speech, literacy and cooperativity. These topics will briefly be developed, giving a sketch of the landscape we constructed at the symposium.

Inner speech is a genuine psycholinguistical topic since the times of Vygotsky and Piaget because the relationship between communicative and cognitive acts cristalizes here.(19) In Vygotsky's account, inner speech develops out of communicative speech through egocentric speech as an intermediary stage. The function of inner speech is primarily an intellectual one, it serves mental orientation, creation of awareness, overcoming of difficulties and hindrances, reflecting and thinking (Vygotskij 2002, 417; chap. 7 of *Thinking and Speech*). This concept is embedded in Vygotsky's view on internalization which is the internal reconstruction of an external operation. This process consists of a series of transformations, one of which is described as the transformation of an intrapersonal process in an interpersonal one. This leads Vygotsky to formulate a weighty conclusion:

All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals.

(Vygotsky 1978, 57)

Departing from there, a relationship between inner speech and internal dialogues can be assumed, inner speech may take a dialogical form (see e.g.

Wertsch 1978, Goudena 1987, Berk 1992, Bertau 1999). Whether Vygotsky himself took a dialogical view on inner speech won't be discussed here, for this would be a topic of its own.(20) For the present context, Vygotsky's fruitful analysis relating communication to cognition, the social to the individual, will suffice as point of departure for thinking about the possibility to see and study cognitive processes in the light of dialogicity.

Literacy is one of the symbolic communicative, verbal activities. As meaningful acts, writing and reading develop out of speaking and listening, these different modes of language are intrinsically related, there is a connexion of action between writing and speaking, between reading and listening. Therefore, oral and literal modes of language are not to be seen as separated, rather a single communicative gesture relates them. This gesture happens to be (spatially, psychologically) more detached in literacy, but it is still there.(21) Because of this detachment, a shift, a transformation of the addressee takes place: the reader must be imagined, his perspective taken, his points of view, arguments, disagreements have to be taken into consideration (see also Ho et al. 2001, 399)..

This is to say that with the means of literacy other modes of reflecting self and other positions come in; as said above: possibilities of moving, distancing, and spatializing emerge. This is a development traceable in the course of literacy acquisition by the child, but also in a wider perspective in the history of alphabetization. Before resulting in a private and inaudible practice, literacy was - in any case in western societies - for a long time a shared, voiced practice. Before reading silently, we read in social communities, this reading being close to oral narrative practices.(22)

One can deduct a socio-cultural influence of communicational, symbolic means on the practice of self-reflection. With increasing silent reading the emergence of inner dialogues is expectable. Because this is connected to a transformation of the experience of the other, one may talk about literacy as leading to a different culture of the other. In comparing cultures in regard to dialogical self concepts it is therefore important to take into consideration whether they are oral or literal, and - in literalized societies - to what extent an individual is literal, which role literacy plays in his/her daily life.

Finally, *cooperativity* refers to the fundamental mutuality of dialogues. Cooperativity can be understood as belonging to the I-positions - as in the conception of Hermans and Kempen (1993). But it can also be unfolded, put back from there into reality, where people have to deal cooperatively with (increasingly global) conflicts and problems. As the image of the self shifts in Hermans and

Kempen (1993) from a centralized, rational and controlled self to a decentralized self with several I-positions connected to different emotional states and points of view, the image of man can and should change toward a more dialogically engaged individual. This would surely mean that the developing of dialogical practice - external and internal - is necessary. This different image of man could open up different possibilities of acting. In this way, internal and external world are related, the perspective being, at the end, a socio-political one.

Notes

- (1) This conception of an open self is to be re-found in Hermans' model of internal and external positions with permeable boundaries between each other, see e.g. Hermans (2001).
- (2) See the notion of „drift“ in Sennett (1998): an undifferent, aimless, floating movement.
- (3) For a detailed and critical discussion of Mead's theory see Hermans and Kempen 1993, chap.7.
- (4) See e.g. Wertsch (1993). Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), russian literary theorist; his analyse of Dostoyevsky brought up the fruitful term of „polyphonic novel“.
- (5) This is clearly to be seen in Minsky (1985). His society of mind corresponds to a societal model with alienated work, delegated responsibility and clear hierarchy. The entities building up the society are not equal to one another: some (the agents) do not need to know what the society is doing, they do not need to be intelligent. It is also worth noting that a societal model always involves a certain perception of work.
- (6) The term „reflexive modernization“ is understood according to Giddens (1990) who views the presumption of a wholesale reflexivity as characteristic for modernity and relates it to a similar movement as Sennett (1998) when saying „modernity floats free“ (39).
- (7) See for a more detailed discussion of the topics of tension and seing-as Bertau 1996, 158-182. Tension belongs of course to dialectics, see for the present context: Ho, Chan, Peng and Ng (2001) in their commentary on Hermans.

- (8) I owe a great deal to Andreas Winderl (computer scientist) for intense and highly interesting discussions and especially for precious hints concerning this passage.
- (9) Intractable is a term found in Ruelle (1992, chap.22), concerning a kind of problems (NP-complete problems) whose solutions need exponentially increasing computing time, depending on the length of the problem. Semi-computable problems are only approximable in an unknown time, and not computable problems will never reach a solution: they are undecidable.
- (10) This unspecified state may be parallelized with Vygotsky's conception of the inner side of speech, where the sense (in contrary to the meaning) of words involves a highly condensed, yet fluid and not structured richness. See Vygotskij 2002, chapter 7.
- (11) This assumption can be traced in Bertau (1999), where internal dialogues (read out of thinking aloud protocols) develop and augment with the degree of problem complexity.
- (12) See Müller (1980), who cites Garfinkel (1975) and his „etc.-assumption“ as basic rule for understanding.
- (13) It is precisely with the term „atmosphere“ that Vygotsky characterizes the environment of the growing child, it is the „atmosphere of a speaking environment“ (see chap.5 of *Thinking and Speaking*, Vygotskij 2002, 179). And Brown (1984), in describing the almost last stage of internalization, uses the term of a benevolent or kind public.
- (14) See the beautiful pictures in Worg 1993, 175ff. Or Peitgen and Richter 1986 31, fig.22.
- (15) I am thinking of Ertel (1972, 1978) and his dogmatism coefficient, reflecting a more or less authoritative character who is more or less able to accept vagueness, incoherence and novelty. This could be parallelized to more or less dialogical movements in the self.
- (16) Literally, *unhintergebar* refers to the impossibility to go behind something; „irreducible“ could be an approximative translation but fails to mark the spatial connotation related to *hinter* (behind) and *geben* (to walk).
- (17) E.g. Fogel et al. (2002), Rochat, Querido and Striano (1999), Nelson (1996), Tomasello (1993), Nelson (1986). I have tried a more precise sketch in Bertau (2004).
- (18) See e.g. Klein (1980) for school children; a more fundamental approach is to be found in Goody and Watt (1986).
- (19) I will be very brief here on Vygostky's account of inner speech; for details see Vygotskij (2002), for discussions see e.g. Zivin (1979), Wertsch (1979), Diaz and Berk (1992).

- (20) See e.g. Watkins (2000, chap.1), holding a monologic position on Vygotsky's inner speech, and Wertsch (1980), holding a dialogic position.
- (21) See Bertau (2003); the basic term *Handlungszusammenhang* is rendered here with „connexion of action“.
- (22) For details concerning antiquity see Bertau (in press), concerning early modern time van Dülmen (1994) and Knoop (1994).

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